Has Democracy Failed in Afghanistan?

The 2014 election is a critical test for Afghanistan's young democracy, at least the western style of democracy that has replaced the traditional Afghan consultative body, the Loya Jirga in existence at least since 1747 .

The current election just like election of 2009 is marred with accusation of massive fraud alleged by Dr. Abdullah's team. But it's not so much about the allegations of fraud that's putting democracy to test in Afghanistan, but it is the threat of civil war and a bloody crisis that could arise as a result of the dispute over the election.

Accusations of fraud is common in developing countries. For example, this week there was election in Indonensia, but both candidates declared victory. Accusations of fraud during election is also common in India, Pakistan and beyond. Afghanistan is no exception.

But what is troubling in Afghanistan is the absence of a 'democratic mindset' among Afghans.

Some believe that if they can't win power through election, they will do so through violence and disregard for rule of law. For example, Dr. Abdullah's team has threatened to bring Abdullah to power through force by declaring a parallel government. This is has led the US and European countries to warn of troops withdrawal and stopping aid if any group tries to seize power through force.

What's is interesting is that Abdullah's team called the result of 2nd round election "coup", but yet the camp itself is trying to overthrow the government by bringing a parallel government which itself is a coup.

Overall, it's the threat and risk that arise from dispute over election that is disturbing and will lead to failure of democracy in Afghanistan.

Election is a critical component of democracy. While I can't argue election has failed democracy in Afghanistan, at the same time I can't make the argument that democracy has succeeded in Afghanistan, at least when one uses election as a benchmark for democratic success.

Paktia Votes: Examining Sample of Results

The following are unedited and direct link to IEC database showing sample results of votes for 2nd round in Paktia. 

I've looked at centers with highest number of votes. The important thing to note is the results are signed by representatives of both candidates. 

It seems unlikely any candidate would have a valid reason to dispute results if their own observers signed off on the result accepting them as valid. That is true not in the case of Paktia, but across Afghanistan. 

Scroll to bottom to see sample. Please note these are direct links to IEC official results. To confirm, right-click on any result sheet and then choose "open image in new tab". You will then see the address to IEC website. 

Abdullah The Accidental Politician?

I hope you paid attention to the question mark in the title. This article asks the question whether Abdullah is an accidental politician or one who really deserves to be one. I will leave the judgement to others, but I will provide some background on him.

It's often said leaders are born and not made. With respect to Dr. Abdullah it appears he was neither born a leader nor made any attempt to be ‘made’ one. But in a country like Afghanistan, when you claim to be a leader, people want to know your political identity, your past, your family and your ideology before they take you seriously. Afghans are very picky when it comes to choosing accepting one as a leader. 

Historian Dr. Hassan Kakar in his book titled Afghanistan, published by University of California press in 1995 writes “All peoples want to know the identity of their rulers, and that desire is particularly strong among the genealogy-conscious Afghans”.  So an individual must be highly influential, have deep roots and come from known families to be taken seriously by Afghans.

Get to know Abdullah

Who is Dr. Abdullah? Actually the answer is not that easy although his supporters would make him appear as a political genius and a national hero. It's widely known he's a mix of Tajik-Pashtun, but he's broadly seen as a resident of Panjshir given his mother was from Panjshir and his close association with Masood, also from Panjshir. Note well, my discussion here has nothing to do with ethnicity, but I'm simply stating facts. I'm fiercely opposed to mixing ethnicity and politics in Afghanistan because that's a recipe for disasters.
  Dr. Abdullah was broadly unknown and an obscure figure in Afghan politics until 9/11, save for him acting as a spokesman for Northern Alliance (NA) and accompanying Ahamd Shah Masood on a few trips as an interpreter. I don't recall his name mentioned in the media until late 1998 when US attacked Khost, Afghanistan targeting training camps.

I'm fiercely opposed to mixing ethnicity and politics in Afghanistan because that's a recipe for disaster. 

Today Masood is a contraversial figure among Afghans. Some regard him as a hero while others see him one of the instigators of the Afghan Civil War of 1992-1996 resulting in killing of thousands and providing the ground for rise of Taliban and Al-Qaeda. In fact, the mere fact that Abdullah was an assistant to Masood has made him an undesirable figure in the eyes of those who see Masood as a harmful figure. I know my statement of Masood is inviting curse of his supporters and praise from his opponents and that conflicting reaction is evidence of the 'Massood controversy'.

Abdullah (third from left) with Masood (first from left). Photo Credit BBC

Abdullah not an anti-Soviet figure

Despite what most believe, Dr. Abdullah is NOT an anti-Soviet or anti-Communist figure. Facts back up this claim. He remained in Soviet-controlled Kabul for over 7 years after Soviet invasion, leaving Afghanistan in 1986 when the Soviet-Afghan war was coming to an end and after getting his M.D. from a Soviet-backed medical institute in Kabul.  He then worked in a hospital in Kabul for some time. This is in contrast to many famous anti-Soviet figures who left Afghanistan in 1979 to joint Mujaheddin. He apparently became a doctor in Panjshir valley helping Mujahideen around 1987, but up to this point he had no political involvement or experience.

Dr. Abdullah was also an unknown figure during Mujahideen rule, 1992-1996 and only surfaced in media when Norther Alliance was formed as he acted as an interpreter and spokesman for the Alliance. For example, he had no official position in government except acting as a spokesperson.

9/11 Attacks and Abdullah's rise to power

After 9/11 and because the West allowed the Northern Alliance to gain power, he became foreign minister in 2002, but made no real progress in the ministry finally leaving in 2005. Fast forwarding history to 2009, with Ahamad Shah Masood dead, Burhaniddin Rabbani made irrelevant and General Fahim moving closer to Hamid Karzai, Dr. Abdullah saw a vacuum in Jamiat Islami and tried to fill it. He ran in 2009 election, but lost it and remained irrelevant until 2014 election.

Now with Ahamad Shah Masood, Rabbani, and General Fahim all dead, Dr. Abdullah sees himself as the 'last bullet' in Jamiat Islami and Shurah-i-Nazar political gun and the primary "inheritor" of Jamiat to make a showdown for power.  To be fair and realistic, today Abdullah enjoys massive support among people who were loyal to Ahmad Shah Masood and Burhanuddin Rabbani and basically his support stops there. He also has support among some Hazaras, especially those loyal to his ally, Mohammad Mohaqiq and a bit of support among Gul Agha Shirzai, a Pashtun from Kandahar.

So I want to pose the question:

Is Dr. Abdullah with no education or experience in governance, history or international relation is on political stage because of competency or just by pure chance, luck and accident?

Ashraf Ghani to Swim with the Sharks

According to preliminary results, Ashraf Ghani is the leading candidate in Afghanistan's runoff election held on June 14 wining 56% of votes. Should he take office in early August as planned, he will face many challenges to tackle: security, corruption, the drug trade, peace talks with the Taliban, improving relations with the United States, dealing with Pakistan and cross-border attacks, managing Afghanistan's economy as international aid is shrinking and many other issues.

Atta Mohammad Noor

But there is a more serious issue that he would have to tackle, something literally all Afghan Presidents for the past 40 years have tried to achieve: extend governance and authority to areas and individuals who oppose the new president. Ghani shouldn't become another "Mayor Kabul".

In particular, how is Ghani going to extend his authority in provinces where his rival Abdullah has over 80% support? How can Ghani deal with pro-Abdullah governors, army, police and intelligence officers, senior government officials loyal to Abdullah either on ethnic or political grounds? 

Swimming with Sharks

Ghani must learn to swim in an ocean with sharks.

To be more specific, Ghani will face opposition from the following:

• Members of the former Northern Alliance
• Members of Jamiate Islami Jihadi party led by slain Burhanuddin Rabbani
• Members of Shura-i-Nizar led by slain Ahamd Shah Masood (except those who are loyal to Ahamd Zia Masood, Ghani's choice of vice president)
• Pro-Abdullah governors such as Attah Mohammad Noor, governor of Balkh province
• Toran Ismahil, former cabinet minister and former governor of Herat province.
• Senior generals in army, police, and intelligence who are staunch supporters of Abdullah 

Ghani's Options

What are the options for Ghani to deal with these individuals?

If he compromises with them and allow them to have control and autonomy in their areas of control, then Ghani has certainly weakened the authority of central government. As a result corruption, bribery and the drug trade will persist; he won't be able to collect revenues from provinces and thus Ghani will allow governments within government.

On the other hand if Ghani stands against these players, then obviously he will face serious threat as these individuals have extensive support and can create headache for Ghani.

Ghani must exhibit superior and authoritative leadership and while he should be flexible and try to bring authority to remote areas gradually, he shouldn't fall in the trap of remaining indifferent and passive in the face of belligerent players such as Atta Noor, armed forces officers, senior government officials and etc. 

Democracy is only successful when it brings good and effective governance. A fragmented and a weak government will only compound existing challenges.

As the new leader of Afghanistan, then perhaps Ghani should come with new and creative ideas to resolve the old problem of a weak central government. The onus is on Ghani.

Seven Reasons Why Abdullah Lost the Election

According to preliminary results released by Afghanistan Independent Election Commission (IEC), Ashraf Ghani won 56.44% of votes while Abdullah Abdullah gained 43.56% of the 8.1 million votes. While we have to wait until final results are released, it is important to discuss some of the factors that have led to demise of Abdullah in Afghan election.

Before I outline the reasons which may have contributed to his defeat, I want to point out that I have intentionally stayed away from discussing the role of ethnicity during election. While the western media so obsessed with describing Ghani as a Pashtun and Abdullah as a Tajik, support for two candidates is not entirely based on ethnicity. Unfortunately, the western media is doing what it has done for the past 35 years: Interpret every Afghan political event across tribal and ethnic lines. While it's true ethnicity is a major factor in Afghanistan's tribal society, we need to look deep beneath the surface to discern other factors.

In any case, below are the 7 reasons why Abdullah lost in election, at least so far.

1. Seen as less competent than Ashraf Ghani
2. Allied with former Mujaheddin involved in Civil War 1992-1996
3. Took a non-compromising stand against Taliban
4. Failed to push for presence of observers in certain provinces
5. Took a confrontational stand against all: IEC, ECC, Karzai, etc.
6. Tried to win Presidency for and perceived by people as a 'Jamiati'
7. Failed to craft a clear and coherent election strategy
   

1.     Seen as less competent than Ashraf Ghani

Many, especially young voters, the educated class, non-partisan national figures, some tribal leaders and women saw Ghani a better fit for presidency than Abdullah. This was largely due to Ghani's vast national and international experience in economics, governance, politics, law and philosophy. The educated class or Roashan-Fikran could relate better with Ghani, a technocrat than to Abdullah a former guerrilla fighter turned-politician.

Opponents believe Abdullah mainly lost because of political incompetency and for having a tainted record from Civil War and being a 'warlord'.

So many, especially the new Afghan generation did not see Abdullah, a former member of Mujaheddin as charismatic, influential or capable of uniting Afghanistan's multi-ethnic groups, particularly given his the role during Civil War of 1992-1996. This is not to say Abdullah's support base is weak across the country or across different demographics. In fact, he has extensive support among members of former Jamiat-i-Islami, Shura-i-Nizar, Ittihad Islami led and Rasoul Sayaf not to mention his strong base in parts of north of Afghanistan and to a marginal degree elsewhere in the country. But despite that, undecided voters, those with no relation with Mujaheddin, the educated class and women saw Ghani as a progressive, a strategist and a national and global figure to lead Afghanistan. Speaking of corruption, Mehmood Karzai who was linked to collapse of Kabul Bank in a massive scandal was reported by the New York Times to have "received millions in loans with no expectations that they would repay them"

2.     Allied with former Mujaheddin involved in Civil War 1992-1996

Abdullah failed to take into consideration peoples' sentiments against Mujaheddin who were behind the destruction of Afghanistan during 1992-1996 Civil War and post-911 manipulations. Figures such as Haji Mohammad Mohaqiq, Sayaaf, Khan Muhammad, Gul Agha Shirzai, Atta Mohammad Noor, Toran Ismahil and many others are highly controversial names as they are often linked to extra-judicial killings, massacres, corruption, land grabbing, drug trade, extortion, intimidation and a total disregard for the rule of law. They all have accumulated massive wealth and power while in the eye of the common Afghan they're seen as manipulators, opportunists, rights abusers and serious threat to Afghanistan's peace and stability. In fact, when people and media refer to a potential second Civil War, these are the individuals who will instigate another civil war. In short, Abdullah's alliance with former Mujahideen and members of Northern Alliance led many to distance themselves from Abdullah.

3.    Took a non-compromising stand against Taliban

Given Taliban's role in overthrowing Burhanuddin Rabbani's government in 1996 in which Abdullah had a role and given Ahmad Shah Masood's strong opposition to Taliban, Abdullah has continued to take a non-compromising stand against Taliban at a time when NATO, but particularly the United States prefers peace talks with them. As far as the US is concerned, a non-compromising Abdullah would be an impediment to bringing America's longest war to a 'honorable' end through making with the Taliban. As such, NATO members, particularly the United States probably frown upon Abdullah as a non-compromisng figure who wants to settle past scores against Taliban than to work towards a compromising future.

4.     Failed to put push for presence of observers in certain provinces

Abdullah didn't learn from the impact of fraud in the election of 2009. Let's face it: This is Afghanistan we're talking about and electoral fraud is a subset of larger corruption fiasco. You can't be a successful politician unless you protect yourself against fraud. So you would think that by his own account, if he was indeed a victim of fraud in 2009, five years later in 2014 he would take steps to falling in the same trap again. 

If indeed there was 'massive' fraud during the 2nd round of 2014 election, then part of the blame goes to Abdullah himself as he acted too late to warn Afghans and the international community of what he called "industrial-scale fraud". In fact, he didn't mention 'fraud' in 1st round of recent election as he was leading. For example, he could have asked for more diligence and observation in pro-Ghani provinces before the election, not after the 2nd round.

Finally, Abdullah was a victim of his own team's contribution to corruption. Bribery, fraud, corruption are part of the system today and Abdullah who claims to be a 'national figure' should take responsibility for (1) contributing to corruption (2) doing nothing to fight against it. 

5.    Took a confrontational stand against all: IEC, ECC, Karzai, etc.

Instead of cooperating with players in the political scene, Abdullah took a very belligerent approach by cutting off relations with the very institutions that were working hard for candidates. He even went further to personally blame Karzai. During a very angry speech, he talked about a grand conspiracy he called the "Palace Triangle", a reference to plot by Karzai, IEC and Ashraf Ghani against him.  Not only such quarreling approach failed to gain him support, it further weakened his credibility. Many saw him as somehow who suddenly lashed out at people and institutions accusing them of serious matters, but failing to provide credible evidence. He did however released a few unverified and unauthentic audio tapes alleging fraud, but they too were interperted as dubious and non-credible by the media and analysts.

6.    Tried to win Presidency for and perceived by people as a Jamiati (member of Jamiat Islami)

While on the surface he presented himself as a national figure, it was obvious he was trying to revive the old Jamiat Islami Jihadi party back to political stage. He allied himself with former Jamiat commanders and figures and during his speeches he often made references to the party. Also, many people for valid reasons saw him not as a national figure, but just another member of Jamiat Islami party that was a primary actor during the destructive Civil War. This was a critical judgement error given he was seen as someone who would engage in power monopoly at the expense of other groups.

7.    Failed to craft a clear and coherent strategy

Abdullah lacked a coherent and clear strategy from the start. In particular, after the 2nd round of election, he became erratic, unpredictable and came up with conflicting, contradictory and unrealistic demands. For example, after news surfaced that there had been higher turnout in eastern provinces, he asked for Amarkhel's removal, especially after it was alleged he was transporting blank voter cards out of IEC office. When Amarkhel resigned and to shock of many, Abdullah went on to accuse the entire IEC, ECC of being part of a plot against him. He then immediately lashed out at Karzai and claimed, he was a victim of "industrial-scale fraud" and released a few more unverified audio tapes alleging fraud. But after the preliminary results were announced, he and his team stated it had been a coup.