Before I outline the reasons which may have contributed to his defeat, I want to point out that I have intentionally stayed away from discussing the role of ethnicity during election. While the western media so obsessed with describing Ghani as a Pashtun and Abdullah as a Tajik, support for two candidates is not entirely based on ethnicity. Unfortunately, the western media is doing what it has done for the past 35 years: Interpret every Afghan political event across tribal and ethnic lines. While it's true ethnicity is a major factor in Afghanistan's tribal society, we need to look deep beneath the surface to discern other factors.
In any case, below are the 7 reasons why Abdullah lost in election, at least so far.
- Seen as less competent than Ashraf Ghani
- Allied with former Mujaheddin involved in Civil War 1992-1996
- Took a non-compromising stand against Taliban
- Failed to push for presence of observers in certain provinces
- Took a confrontational stand against all: IEC, ECC, Karzai, etc.
- Tried to win Presidency for and perceived by people as a 'Jamiati'
- Failed to craft a clear and coherent election strategy
Many, especially young voters, the educated class, non-partisan national figures, some tribal leaders and women saw Ghani a better fit for presidency than Abdullah. This was largely due to Ghani's vast national and international experience in economics, governance, politics, law and philosophy. The educated class or Roashan-Fikran could relate better with Ghani, a technocrat than to Abdullah a former guerrilla fighter turned-politician.
Opponents believe Abdullah mainly lost because of political incompetency and for having a tainted record from Civil War and being a 'warlord'.So many, especially the new Afghan generation did not see Abdullah, a former member of Mujaheddin as charismatic, influential or capable of uniting Afghanistan's multi-ethnic groups, particularly given his the role during Civil War of 1992-1996. This is not to say Abdullah's support base is weak across the country or across different demographics. In fact, he has extensive support among members of former Jamiat-i-Islami, Shura-i-Nizar, Ittihad Islami led and Rasoul Sayaf not to mention his strong base in parts of north of Afghanistan and to a marginal degree elsewhere in the country. But despite that, undecided voters, those with no relation with Mujaheddin, the educated class and women saw Ghani as a progressive, a strategist and a national and global figure to lead Afghanistan. Speaking of corruption, Mehmood Karzai who was linked to collapse of Kabul Bank in a massive scandal was reported by the New York Times to have "received millions in loans with no expectations that they would repay them"
2. Allied with former Mujaheddin involved in Civil War 1992-1996
Abdullah failed to take into consideration peoples' sentiments against Mujaheddin who were behind the destruction of Afghanistan during 1992-1996 Civil War and post-911 manipulations. Figures such as Haji Mohammad Mohaqiq, Sayaaf, Khan Muhammad, Gul Agha Shirzai, Atta Mohammad Noor, Toran Ismahil and many others are highly controversial names as they are often linked to extra-judicial killings, massacres, corruption, land grabbing, drug trade, extortion, intimidation and a total disregard for the rule of law. They all have accumulated massive wealth and power while in the eye of the common Afghan they're seen as manipulators, opportunists, rights abusers and serious threat to Afghanistan's peace and stability. In fact, when people and media refer to a potential second Civil War, these are the individuals who will instigate another civil war. In short, Abdullah's alliance with former Mujahideen and members of Northern Alliance led many to distance themselves from Abdullah.
Given Taliban's role in overthrowing Burhanuddin Rabbani's government in 1996 in which Abdullah had a role and given Ahmad Shah Masood's strong opposition to Taliban, Abdullah has continued to take a non-compromising stand against Taliban at a time when NATO, but particularly the United States prefers peace talks with them. As far as the US is concerned, a non-compromising Abdullah would be an impediment to bringing America's longest war to a 'honorable' end through making with the Taliban. As such, NATO members, particularly the United States probably frown upon Abdullah as a non-compromisng figure who wants to settle past scores against Taliban than to work towards a compromising future.
4. Failed to put push for presence of observers in certain provinces
Abdullah didn't learn from the impact of fraud in the election of 2009. Let's face it: This is Afghanistan we're talking about and electoral fraud is a subset of larger corruption fiasco. You can't be a successful politician unless you protect yourself against fraud. So you would think that by his own account, if he was indeed a victim of fraud in 2009, five years later in 2014 he would take steps to falling in the same trap again.
If indeed there was 'massive' fraud during the 2nd round of 2014 election, then part of the blame goes to Abdullah himself as he acted too late to warn Afghans and the international community of what he called "industrial-scale fraud". In fact, he didn't mention 'fraud' in 1st round of recent election as he was leading. For example, he could have asked for more diligence and observation in pro-Ghani provinces before the election, not after the 2nd round.
Finally, Abdullah was a victim of his own team's contribution to corruption. Bribery, fraud, corruption are part of the system today and Abdullah who claims to be a 'national figure' should take responsibility for (1) contributing to corruption (2) doing nothing to fight against it.
5. Took a confrontational stand against all: IEC, ECC, Karzai, etc.
Instead of cooperating with players in the political scene, Abdullah took a very belligerent approach by cutting off relations with the very institutions that were working hard for candidates. He even went further to personally blame Karzai. During a very angry speech, he talked about a grand conspiracy he called the "Palace Triangle", a reference to plot by Karzai, IEC and Ashraf Ghani against him. Not only such quarreling approach failed to gain him support, it further weakened his credibility. Many saw him as somehow who suddenly lashed out at people and institutions accusing them of serious matters, but failing to provide credible evidence. He did however released a few unverified and unauthentic audio tapes alleging fraud, but they too were interperted as dubious and non-credible by the media and analysts.
6. Tried to win Presidency for and perceived by people as a Jamiati (member of Jamiat Islami)
While on the surface he presented himself as a national figure, it was obvious he was trying to revive the old Jamiat Islami Jihadi party back to political stage. He allied himself with former Jamiat commanders and figures and during his speeches he often made references to the party. Also, many people for valid reasons saw him not as a national figure, but just another member of Jamiat Islami party that was a primary actor during the destructive Civil War. This was a critical judgement error given he was seen as someone who would engage in power monopoly at the expense of other groups.
7. Failed to craft a clear and coherent strategy
Abdullah lacked a coherent and clear strategy from the start. In particular, after the 2nd round of election, he became erratic, unpredictable and came up with conflicting, contradictory and unrealistic demands. For example, after news surfaced that there had been higher turnout in eastern provinces, he asked for Amarkhel's removal, especially after it was alleged he was transporting blank voter cards out of IEC office. When Amarkhel resigned and to shock of many, Abdullah went on to accuse the entire IEC, ECC of being part of a plot against him. He then immediately lashed out at Karzai and claimed, he was a victim of "industrial-scale fraud" and released a few more unverified audio tapes alleging fraud. But after the preliminary results were announced, he and his team stated it had been a coup.
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